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Experimental economics is often called upon to inform theory and aid in explaining real 
world behavior. As such it is important to carefully design laboratory experiments to test 
the validity of new theories and to re-examine results that demonstrate robust anomalies 
of classic theory.  My first aim is to design an experiment that will allow me to test the 
propensity of subjects to use Case-Based Decision Theory (from now on referred to as 
CBDT). I carefully design a setting in which the predicted choices of CBDT are 
deterministic and unique to CBDT (i.e. different from the predicted choices of other 
relevant decision making processes). I examine how well CBDT organizes subject 
choices when subjects are asked to make thirty independent decisions each with a fixed 
and given history. I find that some subjects do appear to be using the information given 
to them in the form of Case-Based Decision making.  
My second goal is to revisit traditional first-price private values auction 
experiments with the idea of making the price-probability trade-off, the central 
consideration in auctions, more salient to subjects. I approach this in two different ways.  
First, I use a custom-designed graphical interface which displays all results both visually 
and numerically.  In this treatment I find that subjects bid more aggressively than 
predicted by risk-neutral Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Second, I restructure the presentation 
of the idiosyncratic reservation value.  Subjects are now engaging in some economic 
behavior and earning their total consumer surplus each period.  This differs from 
traditional first-price private values auction experiments in which subjects only earn a 
payoff if they win the auction.  Here I observe that market prices in a sealed-bid 
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Experimental economics is often called upon to inform theory and aid in explaining real 
world behavior. As such it is important to carefully design laboratory experiments to test 
the validity of new theories and to re-examine results that demonstrate robust anomalies 
of classic theory.  Our first aim is to design an experiment that will allow us to test the 
propensity of subjects to use Case-Based Decision Theory (from now on referred to as 
CBDT). This theory remains, as yet, unexplored in experimental economics. We 
carefully design a setting in which the predicted choices of CBDT are deterministic and 
unique to CBDT (i.e. different from the predicted choices of other relevant decision 
making processes). We examine how well CBDT organizes subject choices when 
subjects are asked to make thirty independent decisions each with a fixed and given 
history. Our second goal is to revisit traditional first-price private values auction 
experiments with the idea of making the price-probability trade-off, the central 
consideration in auctions, more salient to subjects. We approach this in two different 
ways.  First, we use a custom-designed graphical interface which displays all results both 
visually and numerically. Second, we restructure the presentation of the idiosyncratic 
reservation value.  Subjects are now engaging in some economic behavior and earning 
their total consumer surplus each period.  This differs from traditional first-price private 
values auction experiments in which subjects only earn a payoff if they win the auction.   
In Chapter II, “An Experiment on Case-Based Decision Making”, we design an 
experiment to investigate the disposition of subjects to use case based reasoning as 
predicted by Case-Based Decision Theory.  For many decades the driving theory behind 
decision making has been that decision makers attempt to maximize their expected 
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and applied work, not all decision problems under uncertainty easily lend themselves to 
analysis with expected utility theory. CBDT was developed to describe behavior in 
limited information environments where expected utility theory is not a viable process.  
CBDT assumes that decision makers use their past experience to inform current choices 
and that they weight the outcomes of those past experiences using a similarity 
comparison between their current situation and the ones from the past.  In order to obtain 
predictions and make comparisons to actual subject choices we use a feature-based 
similarity function to assess the similarity between current situations and the ones from 
the past.  The theory is implemented by having the subjects act as monopolists making 
production decisions for thirty independent markets. Subjects receive a different 
“history” for each of the 30 markets. Inducing the “history” allows us to control what the 
subjects know and enables us to predict the exact choices the subjects would make if 
they were indeed Case-Based Decision Makers.  The results reveal that some subjects do 
engage in this form of Case-Based decision making.  
In Chapter III, “Framing the First-Price Auction”, we investigate the hypothesis 
that the non-isomorphism between sealed-bid and Dutch laboratory auctions arises from 
framing and presentation effects.  We carefully construct a graphical interface that is 
identical across the two treatments, except for the differences necessary for subjects to 
be able to submit a bid in the sealed-bid format and to allow a clock to tick down in the 
Dutch.  In addition, we present the results of the auction both visually (as rectangles that 
increase in size as the payoff increases) and numerically (in tabular form with a list of 
actual payoffs) to help emphasize the price-probability trade-off that is central to auction 
theory. The graphical interface uses the standard method for presenting idiosyncratic 
reservation values: each subject is given a “resale value” at which he can sell the object 
back to the experimenter upon winning the auction. A subject’s earnings are then 
computed as resale value minus the price paid in the auction if he wins the auction, and 
his earnings are zero if he does not win the auction. We find, however, the difference in 
bidding behavior across the two treatments persists, even when subjects participate in 
sessions lasting 60 periods.  Furthermore, subjects consistently bid significantly more 
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aggressively than is predicted by risk-neutral Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This result 
indicates that employing a graphical interface to present prices and payoffs does not 
make the price-probability trade-off more salient to subjects.  
In Chapter IV, “Reservation Values in Laboratory Auctions: Context and 
Bidding Behavior”, we investigate the hypothesis that the standard presentation of 
reservation values distracts from the price-probability trade-off and results in bidding 
behavior that is more aggressive than that predicted by risk-neutral Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. Using the same graphical interface we introduced in Chapter III, we present 
the reservation value as an “outside price” rather than a “resale value”.  The “outside 
price” is a price at which the bidder can purchase a close substitute outside the auction 
market.  Subjects are instructed that they will purchase one unit of commodity each 
period either in the auction at the price they bid or outside the auction at their outside 
price. Subjects’ earnings are calculated as their total consumer surplus, regardless of 
whether they win the auction.  This differs from the typical earnings calculation in 
laboratory auctions as described above. Discussions following classroom experiments in 
which students participated in “traditional” auction experiments suggest that a central 
consideration in their decision making was to “try to win” the auction, because that is the 
only way to receive a positive payoff. We hypothesize that subjects earning their total 
consumer surplus each period lessens the focus on the “just win” paradigm and allows 
the price-probability trade-off to become more salient. We find that bidding behavior in 
the outside price frame is significantly less aggressive than bidding behavior in the resale 
value frame for first-price sealed-bid auctions, even though the risk neutral Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium remains unchanged across the two treatments.  
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CHAPTER II 
AN EXPERIMENT ON CASE-BASED DECISION MAKING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For many decades the driving theory behind decision making has been that decision 
makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. Even though this theory is widely 
known and commonly used, both in theoretical and applied work, not all decision 
problems under uncertainty easily lend themselves to analysis with expected utility 
theory. In order to apply expected utility theory a decision maker (DM) needs to know 
all possible states of the world and the outcomes associated with them. In many decision 
problems under uncertainty, states of the world are neither naturally given nor can they 
be simply formulated. Oftentimes, even a comprehensive list of all possible outcomes is 
neither readily available nor easily imagined. How should a DM choose in such 
situations? One alternative model of the decision making process that has been 
formulated is Case-Based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995). The basic 
premise behind Case-Based Decision Theory (henceforth CBDT) is that a DM uses her 
past experience to help evaluate current choices, rather than constructing beliefs about 
certain states of the world occurring. CBDT suggests that agents believe that taking 
similar actions in similar situations will result in similar outcomes. 
While CBDT has been the focus of some applied work in economics (e.g. in 
financial markets, Guerdjikova, 2002 and 2003; housing markets, Gayer et al., 2004; and 
capacity planning, Jahnke et al., 2005), little experimental evidence has been gathered by 
economists to test the theory. The purpose of this paper is to design an experiment to test 
the predictive power of CBDT for situations where a DM knows very little about the 
underlying environment and would have difficulty imagining all possible states or 
outcomes relevant for the decision. Although similarity is central to the decision making 
process of a Case-Based decision maker, CBDT itself is fairly silent about the details of 
the similarity function. CBDT shows that similarity is derived from preferences and 
therefore could be unique to each individual. However, much of the theoretical work 
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takes similarity as given and the same across individuals and applied work simplifies the 
analyses further by assuming that similarity between situations is always equal to one or 
by treating similarity as a binary variable in which all situations are either identical 
(similarity equal to one) or completely different (similarity equal to zero). 
In this paper, we assume a specific form of the similarity function that is widely 
used in the psychology literature: Feature based similarity (Tversky, 1977). We argue 
that this specific similarity function is plausible given the description of the environment 
the subjects in our experiment face. In the experiment, the similarity function can take 
on values between, and including, 0 and 1. With this implementation we are able to 
predict the choices that a Case-Based DM would make and can compare them with 
actual behavior of participants in the experiment. This allows us to test whether our 
subjects employ case based reasoning (coupled with feature based similarity) in their 
decision making. Note that our paper is not aimed at deriving individual similarity 
functions given the choices people make. Such an objective would require a completely 
different experimental design.  
In order to test the robustness of the predictions of CBDT we vary two things. 
First, we contrast behavior in situations when CBDT can be used to situations when it 
cannot be used. This is achieved by comparing choices in situations in which the DM 
has some information about the current problem to when she does not. In the latter the 
agent has no information on which to base a similarity comparison. Second, we analyze 
if economic framing of the decision task makes the subject more prone to use CBDT. 
We do this by framing the decision task either as a choice of output problem for a 
monopolist, or by framing it as an abstract decision problem. Our results reveal some 
support for CBDT. Predicted choices coincide more often with actual choices when 
participants are given information about the current situation alongside a “history.” 
Framing does not appear to matter for the ability of CBDT to explain subjects’ choices. 
However, we also find support for a simple heuristic being used in the limited 
information environments we analyze. In particular, equally many participants seem to 
be guided by CBDT as by the heuristic which assumes that the action with the highest 
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payoff in memory will give the highest current payoff. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 introduces CBDT and the notion of similarity. It gives a 
motivation for the specific functional form of similarity that we are using. Section 3 
explains the experimental design. Section 4 states our hypotheses. Section 5 discusses 
the experimental results and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. Appendix A 
contains a sample set of instructions. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Case-Based Decision Theory 
Often times, decisions have to be made with very little information about the underlying 
environment. Consider the following example where only limited information is 
available. The manager of a firm is looking to hire a technician for her IT department. 
Her choice set is given by the applicants for the job. She knows that she is looking for a 
technician who is highly skilled at computer networking, fluent in visual basic, and can 
lead and motivate the rest of the IT team. She, however, does not know how each 
candidate would perform if hired. For example, a candidate may be highly skilled in all 
of the requisite areas, but it may turn out that he is going through a painful divorce and is 
continuously late for work and often depressed. Or a candidate may display great 
leadership and organizational skills but may turn out to be very poorly skilled at 
computer networking. The more she thinks about it the more she realizes that other 
problems may also occur and that she has no way of knowing what they might be or how 
they might affect the company. The manager is facing uncertainty, ambiguity, and a lack 
of information on several measures.  
There are several difficulties with fitting this problem into the framework of 
expected utility. First, the states of the world do not naturally suggest themselves. 
Second, imagining all of the possible outcomes for each action is not a trivial task. This 
would amount to imagining every possible thing that could happen once an employee is 
hired and imagining all of those things for every possible employee. Lastly, even after an 
action has been taken, the outcome may not reveal the realized state of the world or 
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whether the action chosen was optimal or not. For situations like this, when DMs cannot 
be guided by expected utility theory, CBDT has been suggested as an alternative. 
The basic premise behind CBDT is that a DM uses her past experiences (or the 
experiences of others) to help evaluate current choices, rather than relying on beliefs 
about certain states of the world occurring. In the above example, if each job candidate 
provided references, then the manager could use the candidate’s previous performance to 
help assess how each candidate would perform if she was hired. In order to help evaluate 
past outcomes, an agent possesses a similarity function that measures how similar the 
current situation is to a past situation. The agent is assumed to compare the current 
situation to all available past situations. The more similar the current situation is to a past 
situation the more heavily the agent will weight the outcome of that past situation. The 
agent is then assumed to choose the action that maximizes the sum of the similarity 
weighted outcomes of all past situations. 
Formally, a Case-Based DM is assumed to have a memory, M, consisting of a set 
of cases. A case is formed by a problem or situation, q, the action chosen in that 
situation, a, and the utility, u(r), gained from choosing action a in situation q and 
receiving the result r. The Case-Based DM is shown to possess a similarity function, s, 
which evaluates the similarity between the current situation and any past situation. When 
confronted with a problem, p, the Case-Based DM chooses the action a that maximizes 







, )(),()()(           (2.1) 
where s(p, q) measures the similarity between the current situation, p, and some past 
situation, q. When considering any action a, the Case-Based DM only concerns herself 
with past situations in which that particular action was chosen. If in a past situation 
action a was not chosen, then the result and the subsequent utility obtained in that 
situation are ignored1.  
                                                 
1 For a version of case-based decision theory that allows the agent to use such information, see Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1997). 
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In other words, a case-based DM adds up, over all cases in her memory, the 
similarity weighted utility that each action has received2.  Whichever action has the 
largest sum is the action that is predicted to be chosen in the current situation. Note that 
this means that any action that has never been chosen in the past will never be chosen in 




Let’s reconsider the example of the IT manager. Assume the manager received equally 
outstanding references for two candidates (Bob and Betty) and she must decide between 
them. Suppose Bob’s reference was from a previous job in which he designed and 
maintained web pages. However, Betty’s reference was from a previous job in which she 
was the head of a large corporation’s IT department and was responsible for maintaining 
all networking. It seems obvious that the similarity between the past situation in which 
Betty was hired and the manager’s current one is greater than the similarity between the 
past situation in which Bob was hired and the current one. Therefore Betty’s outstanding 
recommendation will receive more weight than Bob’s and the manager will choose to 
hire Betty.  
While the above example seems intuitive, we have to consider a specific form for 
the similarity function in order to obtain actual choice predictions from CBDT. While 
the notion of similarity has not been widely studied in the economics literature, it has 
been the subject of much discourse in the psychology literature (see Goldstone and Son, 
2005 for an overview)4. Most of the models of similarity can be divided into two groups: 
geometric models and feature-matching models. 
Geometric models assume that the objects that are being evaluated can be 
represented in some n-dimensional space. The (dis)similarity between two objects is 
then calculated as some measure of distance between the two objects. The most typical 
                                                 
2 CBDT does not make any distinction between an action that resulted in zero utility and one that simple 
was not chosen, since zero utility is taken as the default aspiration level. 
3 In such a scenario a case-based DM is assumed to randomly choose an action from the set of available 
actions that have not yet been chosen. 
4 See Rubenstein (1988) and Sarin and Vahid (2004) for previous applications in economics. 
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measures are the Euclidean distance and the City-Block distance. While these models 
have desirable mathematical properties, experimental studies have shown that they do 
not do well in representing how subjects actually perceive similarity (see Goldstone and 
Son, 2005 and Tversky, 1977 for overviews)5. 
In response to some of these findings, Tversky (1977) developed a model of 
similarity that assumes that objects can be described by a set of features and that 
similarity is defined over the features that two objects have in common and those that 
they do not have in common. This allows an agent much more flexibility in measuring 
the similarity between two objects, and also allows similarity to be measured among 
objects that do not naturally lend themselves to placement in some n-dimensional space. 
Specifically, Tversky’s model says that similarity is calculated in the following manner. 
Let A be the set of features associated with object a and let B be the set of features 
associated with object b. The measure of how similar a is to b is given by s(a, b) = θf(A 
∩ B) − βf(A − B) − γf(B − A), where θ, β and γ are positive constants. Thus, the similarity 
between two objects, a and b, is a function of the set of features the two have in 
common, those that a has but b does not, and those that b has but a does not. This allows 
the measure of similarity between a and b to be positive or negative and it allows the 
similarity between a and b to differ from the similarity between b and a. 
In order to remain within the bounds of Case-Based Decision Theory, we use a 
simplified version of Tversky’s feature based similarity function when calculating its 
predictions in our setup. The underlying axioms of CBDT imply that the similarity 
function a Case-Based DM uses can only take on values between 0 and 1. To achieve 
this we choose β = γ = 0 to prevent the similarity function from taking negative values. 
We assume that all features are given the same weight when calculating similarity, i.e. it 
                                                 
5 In particular, several of the properties of the geometric models are consistently violated by experimental 
subjects. First, it has been shown that the identity property does not hold, i.e. subjects do not always 
perceive an object as identical to itself (see Podgorny and Garner, 1979). Second, actual similarity 
evaluations are not always symmetric (see Holyoak and Gordon, 1983; and Ortony et al., 1985). For 
instance, a subject reporting that domestic cats are very similar to tigers does not necessarily indicate that 
the same subject will report that tigers are very similar to domestic cats. Lastly, the triangle inequality 
often does not hold, nor does transitivity (Tverksy and Gati, 1982). Finding objects A and B very similar 
and objects B and C very similar does not necessarily indicate that the subject will find objects A and C 
very similar. 
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is not more important to have feature 1 in common than it is to have, say, feature 2 in 
common. We let f count the number of features two objects have in common. CBDT 
assumes that if two objects are identical then the similarity between them is equal to 1 
and that it is equal to 0 if they have no features in common. To ensure this we set the 
parameter θ equal to the reciprocal of the maximum number of features two objects 
could possibly have in common. With the additional assumption of u(r) = r the decision 
problem of a Case-Based DM can be formulated as,  








, )()()(max Iθ    (2.2) 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Given that our experiment is the first to investigate Case-Based decision making in 
economics, there are several aspects of our design that we need to discuss in detail. 
CBDT aims to guide behavior in situations where a DM never faces the same problem 
twice. As such we decided to confront subjects with 30 different situations. In the 
instructions, and in the questionnaire following the instructions, we made sure that the 
subjects understood that the situations were independent from one another and that 
decisions made for one situation would not affect any other situation. It was also 
emphasized that the decisions and resulting outcomes are independent across 
participants.  
Central to CBDT is the idea that a current case is compared to the cases in the 
decision maker’s “memory.” Therefore, control over the memory is important in order to 
make accurate predictions about the behavior of a true Case-Based DM. We did not want 
subjects to “build” a memory over the 30 different situations they faced during the 
experiment. We therefore decided to induce a separate “history” for each of the 30 
situations, i.e., a different memory for each situation. For each situation, we displayed 
four “scenarios” or cases. The scenarios that were displayed were different for each 
situation. In each of the four scenarios, a different choice was made and that choice and 
the associated payoff that would have been earned were displayed. Thus, the memory of 
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each subject, for each situation, consisted of 4 cases, their descriptions, actions chosen 
and resulting payoffs6.  
We ensured that in each situation each action was a possible choice for a Case-
Based decision maker by having each memory contain one observation of each possible 
action. A Case-Based decision maker would calculate the similarity between the current 
situation and the four scenarios and use the similarity measure to weight the outcome 
that was “received” in that scenario. The choice with the highest similarity-weighted 
payoff is the one that a Case-Based decision maker would choose. While the scenarios 
and choices were randomly generated, the final display was not random. We displayed 
four scenarios and their corresponding choices such that predictions for CBDT were 
different from those of expected utility theory7. It was also the case that the predictions 
for CBDT differed from the optimal (profit maximizing) choice in all but 5 of the 30 
markets. This was done so that there would be no confusion as to whether subjects were 
really using CBDT to make their choices or if they were simply maximizing their 
earnings. As such, in this design, any subject who does use CBDT to make their choices 
will be (unconsciously) doing so at a cost. This could be seen as making the case for 
CBDT stronger.  
Since there is no standard practice in implementing CBDT in a laboratory 
environment, we test the robustness of our findings by varying our experimental 
implementation along two dimensions. First, we vary whether the situations are framed 
in an economic context or not. Second, we vary whether subjects are given information 
about the current situation in addition to the four scenarios (cases) in the induced 
memory or not. Table 2.1 summarizes our 2×2 between-subject design. 
 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for a full set of the instructions. We emphasized in the instructions that these choices 
were not chosen to maximize earnings, but were selected randomly with the constraint that each possible 
choice was chosen exactly once. We further emphasized that these were hypothetical scenarios and that 
subjects would not be paid for these choices. They would only be paid for choices they made during the 
experiment.  
7 This was done so that it was possible to distinguish between subjects behaving as if they were case-based 
DMs and those behaving as if they were maximizing expected utility. Of course, the latter was not 
calculable in our setting. 
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Table 2.1  The 2x2 experimental design. 
 Information 
Frame Past + Current Past Only 
Monopoly 39 subjects 30 subjects 




The framing treatments were done to investigate whether certain frames trigger 
subjects to think more carefully about the similarity between their current situation and 
the ones from their “memory” or whether they hinder such comparisons. For the 
treatments with a frame we were looking for an individual decision making task with an 
economic content. We chose a monopoly situation. 
The information treatments were done in order to make sure that subjects were 
not just “accidentally” making a choice in line with CBDT. Given that there are only 
four available choices even a subject acting randomly would appear to choose the action 
predicted by CBDT approximately 25% of the time. Furthermore, if we see subjects’ 
choices aligned with CBDT predictions in roughly the same proportion over both 
information treatments then we should conclude that CBDT is not actually explaining 
their choices but rather that this is happening just by coincidence. However, if we find 
that the proportion of subject choices explained by CBDT is significantly higher in the 
treatments with the current information than without, then we can conclude that subjects 
are making use of this extra information and that they appear to be doing so in the 
manner suggested by Case-Based decision theory8. 
In the treatments with an economic frame, subjects were told that they were a 
monopoly firm that had to make production choices for 30 different markets9. The 
production choice could be one of four values, 50, 100, 150, or 200 units. In the 
treatments in which information about the current situation was given, this information 
was presented as a marketing report that included information on a set of market 
conditions. Subjects were informed that their profits would depend on their production 
                                                 
8 Note that we calculate the predictions of CBDT in the treatments without current information as if this 
information was available. 
9 Participants were told that they could think of making production decisions for 30 different islands. 
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choice and may depend on some of these market conditions. The four scenarios in the 
“memory” were presented as four different marketing reports, with information on the 
same set of market conditions as the current report. One of the four production values 
was then chosen at random to be displayed with each report and the profits that would 
have resulted from that production value given the market conditions in the report were 
displayed alongside the production choice. After making a production choice, subjects 
were informed about their profits from that market and then moved on to the next 
situation (i.e. market). 
We used a total of 12 different market conditions. However, subjects did not 
know this. In fact, in each market subjects were only given information on a random 
subset of 5 conditions10 11. In order not to overload our monopoly frame, we decided to 
name our market conditions as neutrally as possible. In particular, we did not want to 
give the names too much economic meaning and have subjects trying to guess which 
ones might influence their sales and therefore their profits. We came up with Tourist 
Population, Wind, UV Factor, Chance of Rain, % of Population Female, Humidity, 
Traffic Conditions, Temperature, Literacy Rate, Median Age, # of Potential Buyers, and 
Gas Price12. For each market each condition was randomly chosen to have a value of 
either 1, 2, or 3. In order to implement a feature-based similarity approach we displayed 
all values as symbols13. Subjects were told that the marketing report in each market was 
transmitted by their marketing department with an error that resulted in all 
numbers/levels being erased and only symbols being reported. Subjects were informed 
that the error was consistent, i.e. the same symbol for the same market condition always 
meant the same thing, while it could mean different things for different market 
conditions.  
                                                 
10 By displaying different market conditions for each market we wanted to emphasize that each of these 
markets/decisions was in fact independent. 
11 The market conditions displayed in the hypothetical scenarios were the same as those given in the 
marketing report so that similarity comparisons could be made between them.  
12 Subjects never saw the last two conditions: # of potential buyers and gas price. Subjects did not even 
know that these conditions existed. 
13 Besides eliminating geometric similarity considerations this also got rid of potential home made priors 
of the following type: “The temperature is very high today so I shouldn’t produce very much because it’s 
too hot for buyers to want to be out shopping.” 
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CBDT was conceived under the premise that in many decision problems states of 
the world are neither naturally given nor can they be simply formulated. Furthermore, it 
assumes that often even a comprehensive list of all possible outcomes is neither readily 
available nor easily imagined. We implement this lack of information in a potentially 
complex decision environment by designing different payoff functions for each market. 
We generated different payoff functions and used each one twice. The payoff functions 
varied according to which choice maximized expected payoff and the “penalty” for 
making a non-optimal choice14. Of the 12 market conditions a randomly selected set of 4 
would enter the payoff function in each market. Out of the 5 conditions that the subjects 
saw in each market, 3 actually mattered (i.e. were payoff relevant) and the other 2 did 
not. We reserved two market conditions that were never reported to the subjects. One of 
these was chosen at random to enter the payoff function in each market. We did this in 
order to create a complex environment, in which it is impossible for subjects to figure 
out potential states of the world or associated outcomes.  
In the abstract frame the basic setup remained the same as in the monopoly 
frame, however, all economic and market terminology was removed from the 
instructions and the computer screens. Subjects were told that they were making 
decisions for 30 different, independent situations. The available choices were now 1, 2, 
3, or 4 and the labels for the conditions in each situation were changed to be A, B, C, D, 
E, F, G, H, I, or J. Also, the payoffs in the abstract frame were represented as Earnings 
instead of Profits.  
The experiments were conducted at the Economic Research Laboratory at Texas 
A&M University between March and October 2006. Elicitations to participate in the 
experiments were randomly sent out to all undergraduate students in our database of 
about 1,200 from a diverse background of majors. The experimental interface was 
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 1999). On average the experimental sessions lasted 
about 90 minutes and average earnings were $21.32 with a minimum of $15.37 and a 
                                                 
14 To ensure comparability across treatments, the subjects faced the same payoff functions in the same 
order.  
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maximum of $24.56 (this includes a $5 show-up fee)15. We tested the participants’ 
comprehension in a questionnaire after reading the instructions and subjects seemed to 
understand since they answered the majority of all questions correctly. We also collected 
some demographic data in an ex-post questionnaire.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
We analyze the predictive power of CBDT in the different treatments. Since EUT is not 
a reasonable alternative decision making procedure in the environments we consider, we 
looked for simple decision making principles that deliver predictions in our environment 
and that can pose as an alternative to CBDT. Heuristics, or rules of thumb, referring to 
useful and indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be 
handled by logic and probability theory (e.g. Polya, 1954), suggest themselves. 
Heuristics are strategies that guide information search and modify representations to 
facilitate solutions (e.g. Simon, 1955).  
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) introduced such a fast and frugal algorithm, 
called “Take the Best” for a search problem. While we use the same basic principle as 
“Take the Best,” the implementation of this heuristic is quite different (and much 
simpler) in our environment. As such we call this heuristic the “Max-Heuristic” in our 
setting. Given that our subjects are given 4 scenarios (i.e., cases) for each of the 
decisions that they are facing (with each possible choice being chosen once), the Max-
Heuristic would predict that a DM choose the choice that returned the highest payoff in 
those cases. Note that in the treatment where information about the current situation is 
given this would mean that DMs ignore that information. In the treatments when such 
information is not given, the Max-Heuristic seems a natural choice.  
In order to distinguish whether our subjects used Case-Based reasoning or the 
Max-Heuristic, we calibrated the predicted choices such that the choices predicted by 
CBDT were different from those of the Max-Heuristic in all but 7 situations. 
Furthermore, the earnings from using the Max-Heuristic were chosen to be higher than 
                                                 
15 Sessions varied in size from 4 to 18 participants. 
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the earnings from using CBDT. This was done in order to discriminate against CBDT 
making any findings of subjects behaving like a Case-Based DM more credible. We 
formulate the following two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 refers to comparisons across 
treatments and Hypothesis 2 refers to a comparison between CBDT and the Max-
Heuristic. 
H1. CBDT is a better predictor of choices in treatments when the current 
information is available than when it is not.  
H2. Max-Heuristic is a better predictor of choices than CBDT in 
treatments when the current information is not available. 
We do not have any hypotheses regarding the framing of the situations. Given 
our choice of abstract symbols to represent features, one might argue that the abstract 
frame goes better with such a representation, and hence favors CBDT. But one could 
also argue that similarity comparisons are more difficult when there is no frame of 
reference to indicate that it is preferable or informative for two conditions to have the 
same symbol, hence making the use of CBDT less likely.  
 
RESULTS 
Behavior across Treatments 
We first analyze how well the predictions of CBDT and the Max-Heuristic match 
observed behavior16. Our interest lies in predicting individual behavior rather than the 
average behavior of participants. We therefore calculate the mean squared deviations 
(MSDs) of the theoretical prediction (either CBDT or Max-Heuristic) from the observed 
choice for all 30 decisions a subject faced. We did this for each subject and calculated 
the mean for each subject over the 30 situations. If every period’s choice coincides with 
its prediction a subject would show a MSD of 0, and if the subject never selected as 
predicted by theory her MSD would equal 2.  
                                                 
16 The predictions of CBDT in the treatments without current information were calculated as if the current 
information was available. All subjects were given the same order of underlying payoff functions for 
comparability across treatments. 
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For a first test of Hypothesis 1 we compare the median of the individual MSDs 
across the different information treatments. We find that the median of subjects’ MSDs 
is significantly higher in the treatments where the current information is not available, 
indicating worse performance of the CBDT predictions in that case and supporting 
Hypothesis 1. Results of Robust Rank Order Tests are given in Table 2.2. These tests 
also show that there is no framing effect. CBDT predicts equally well in the abstract and 
in the monopoly frame when current information is provided and equally poorly when 
such information is not given.  
 
 
Table 2.2  Tests for differences in Case-Based MSDs. 
Robust Rank Order Test z-statistic 
Monopoly: w/o Current vs w/ Current 2.56** 
Abstract: w/o Current vs w/ Current 2.73** 
w/ Current: Monopoly vs Abstract -0.08 
w/o Current: Monopoly vs Abstract -1.14 











Table 2.3 indicates that the Max-Heuristic predicts actual choices significantly 
better in the monopoly frame when no current information is available as compared to 
the same frame when such information is available. However, it seems as if there is a 
slight framing effect, since this difference does not hold up in the abstract frame. This 
could possibly be because subjects in the abstract frame seem to be guided by the Max-
Heuristic even when information on the current situation is available. 
Table 2.3  Tests for differences in Max-Heuristic MSDs. 
Robust Rank Order Test z-statistic 
Monopoly: w/ Current vs w/o Current 2.28** 
Abstract: w/ Current vs w/o Current -0.51 
w/ Current: Monopoly vs Abstract 0.13 
w/o Current: Monopoly vs Abstract -1.31 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
 18 
Behavior within Treatments 
Table 2.4 reveals support for Hypothesis 2. It shows that when information about the 
current situation is not given, the Max-Heuristic predicts choices better than CBDT (i.e. 
individual MSDs of observed choices from predicted choices are lower). Table 2.4, 
however, also demonstrates that CBDT does not predict a larger proportion of choices 
when compared to the Max-Heuristic, indicating that equally many participants are 
guided by CBDT as are guided by the Max-Heuristic when both could provide decision 
making guidance.   
 
 
Table 2.4 Case-Based versus Max-Heuristic.   
Robust Rank Order Test z-statistic 
Monopoly w/ Current -0.46 
Monopoly w/o Current 4.83** 
Abstract w/ Current 0.48 
Abstract w/o Current 2.91** 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
 
In a next step we would like to not just compare levels of MSDs across the 
treatments, we would like to get a better understanding of what these levels mean. For 
example, we are interested in whether a pure random choice model would do better than 
either, CBDT or Max-Heuristic. Furthermore, we would like to understand what 
percentage of an individual’s choices are predicted correctly in each treatment. 
If a subject was choosing randomly, one could interpret this as meaning that she 
would coincide with the predictions 25% of the time (since there are four choices to 
choose from). Given that CBDT as well as the Max-Heuristic are deterministic models, 
it seems unfair to compare them to a probabilistic one where each entry in the prediction 
vector is 0.2517. We therefore establish the benchmark of random choice as being correct 
                                                 
17 Such a calculation would lead to an MSD of 0.75. In general, the calculation of MSDs favors 
probabilistic models over point predictions. See Selten (1998) for an axiomatization of quadratic scoring 
rules.  
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25% of the time and obtaining a MSD of 0 and being incorrect 75% of the time realizing 
a MSD of 2. The average over all 30 decisions is then 1.5.  
We also establish two other benchmarks, predicting correctly at least half of the 
time (15 out of 30 situations) and predicting correctly at least two-thirds of the time (20 
out of 30 situations). Table 2.5 shows the percentage of people for whom CBDT predicts 
at least as well as the given category, i.e. returns a lower MSD. Table 2.6 illustrates the 
same for the Max-Heuristic. 
 
 
Table 2.5  Observed frequencies of individual MSDs when comparing 
choices to CBDT predictions. 
    CBDT predicts correctly more often than: 
    
Random 
(MSD<1.5) 




Monopoly w/ Current 79.5% (31/39) 25.6% (10/39) 15.4% (6/39) 
Monopoly w/o Current 70.0% (21/30) 3.3% (1/30) 0% (0/30) 
Abstract w/ Current 80.6% (25/31) 22.6% (7/31) 16.1% (5/31) 
Abstract w/o Current 43.8% (14/32) 0% (0/32) 0% (0/32) 
 
 
Table 2.6  Observed frequencies of individual MSDs when comparing choices 
to Max-Heuristic predictions 
  Max-Heuristic predicts correctly more often than: 
    
Random 
(MSD<1.5) 




Monopoly w/ Current 87.2% (34/39) 20.5% (8/39) 10.3% (4/39) 
Monopoly w/o Current 93.3% (28/30) 33.3% (10/30) 26.7% (8/30) 
Abstract w/ Current 71.0% (22/31) 45.2% (14/31) 32.3% (10/31) 
Abstract w/o Current 78.1% (25/32) 28.1% (9/32) 21.9% (7/32) 
 
 
By comparing the last column of Table 2.5 with the last column of Table 2.6, we 
find additional support for hypotheses 1 and 2. CBDT predicts choices correctly at least 
two-thirds of the time for more subjects in treatments when current information is 
provided compared to when such information is not available (Test of Equality of 
Proportions: monopoly frame, z-value= 2.25, one-tailed p = 0.0122; abstract frame, z-
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value= 2.37, one- tailed p = 0.0089)18. In fact, CBDT cannot be applied in the treatments 
without the current information and observing that for no subject CBDT predicts more 
than two-thirds of their choices is reassuring. In those treatments, we find that the 
alternative Max-Heuristic predicts more than two-thirds of the choices correctly for more 
subjects than CBDT (Test of Equality of Proportions: monopoly frame, z-value= 3.04, 
one-tailed p = 0.0012; abstract frame, z-value= 2.80, one-tailed p = 0.0026), again 
supporting Hypothesis 219. 
 
Learning 
There are different types of learning that could take place in our experiment. First, it 
seems natural to ask whether our subjects learn to become case- based decision makers. 
If this was the case, we should observe the individual MSDs (calculated with respect to 
the CBDT predictions) to get smaller over time. Second, our subjects could learn across 
situations. For the purpose of our paper it is important that there be no such learning. 
However, since we gave subjects feedback about their performance after each decision, 
it could be argued that some choices get positively reinforced. 
In order to address the first type of learning we calculate the average of an 
individual’s MSDs over the first half of the experiment and compare this with the 
average of an individual’s MSDs over the second half. We find that 44% (17/39) show a 
smaller MSD in the second half of the experiment in the monopoly frame when current 
information is provided. This holds for 42% (13/31) in the abstract frame when current 
                                                 
18 The specific test statistic is 
cp





ppS ccpc +−= is an estimate of the standard error of the difference in proportions,  
p1 – p2.  pc is an estimate of the population proportion under the null hypothesis of equal proportions, 
)()( 212211 NNNpNppc ++= where Ni is the total number of subjects in sub-sample i (see 
Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985).  
19 Doing the same exercise for the Max-Heuristic, we find that the Max-Heuristic predicts better (i.e. a 
higher proportion of people for whom it predicts correctly at least 2/3 of the time) in the monopoly frame 
when current information is not provided than when it is. This does not hold in the abstract frame (Test of 
Equality of Proportions: monopoly frame, z-value = 1.78 one-tailed p-value = 0.0375; abstract frame, z-
value = -0.92, one-tailed p-value = 0.1788). 
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information is provided. Both of these percentages are not different from those that show 
an increase in their MSDs (Test of Equality of Proportions, monopoly frame, z-value= 
−1.13, one-tailed p = 0.1292; abstract frame, z-value= −1.27, one-tailed p = 0.1020). We 
can therefore conclude that subjects do not tend to use CBDT more often over time, i.e. 
there is no learning towards becoming a Case-Based DM.  
In order to address the second type of learning, we simulated two different 
learning models, a reinforcement learning model (Roth and Erev, 1995) and a payoff 
assessment learning model (Sarin and Vahid, 1999)20 21.  
Since the reinforcement learning model (RL) is a probabilistic learning model 
and the payoff assessment (PA) model is a deterministic model, we evaluate each against 
a different “calibration” of a random model. The MSD of a random model is 0.75 when 
a predicted probability vector is compared to the actual choice. We use this as a 
benchmark for the RL model. However, as we have noted before, such a comparison 
would bias against any deterministic prediction. We therefore use a benchmark of 1.5 for 
the PA model. Table 2.7 reports the results of these comparisons. 
While the PA model seems to do better than the RL model when each is 
compared to a random model, it is worthwhile to note that the PA model could not 
predict more than 50% of the choices any subject made (i.e. no individual MSD was 
lower than 1). For the RL model we find very little variance in the MSDs, with a 
minimum of 0.7249 and a maximum of 0.9343 indicating close to random performance.  
While it seems easy to reject the notion that our subjects learned across situations 
in a reinforcement type of way, we find that behavior of some subjects, at least for some 
situations (although never for the majority of them), can be modeled by a payoff 
assessment type of learning. This raises the question of whether we would have observed 
                                                 
20 Both learning models were simulated 100 times with the weight of the current payoff being 0.9. Note 
that this is a modification of the RL model used by Roth and Erev (1995) in order to “equalize” treatment 
of obtained payoffs across the two different models. With this modification, if player j chooses k at time t 
and receives a payoff of x, then the propensity to choose k at time t + 1 is qjk(t+1) = 0.1 qjk(t) + 0.9x, while 
for all other possible choices n, qjn(t+1) = qjn(t).  
21 Payoffs for the reinforcement learning model were transformed such that they were all positive and 
initial propensities were set at the mean of the newly transformed payoffs in the first round. For the payoff 
assessment model, initial assessments were set equal to the ones seen in the first four scenarios in the first 
situation of the experiment. 
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stronger evidence for CBDT if we had not given subjects information about their 











Decision Time and Earnings 
Figure 2.1 shows the average time in seconds that it took participants to confirm their 
choices in the treatments when current information was provided. Participants are put 
into three distinct groups. The “CBDT” group includes participants for whom CBDT 
predicts choices correctly more than two-thirds of the time. The “Max-Heuristic” group 
includes participants for whom the Max-Heuristic predicts choices correctly more than 
two-thirds of the time. Everybody else is put into the group called “Rest.” Participants 
who seem to be guided predominantly by CBDT take equally long in either framework 
when the current information is provided (Robust Rank Order Test, U = 0.1631, n.s.). 
While it appears that subjects for whom the Max-Heuristic predicts choices correctly 
more than two-thirds of the time take longer in the abstract frame than in the monopoly 
frame when the current information is provided, this difference is not significant (Robust  
Rank Order Test, U = 0.6159, n.s.). Subjects who can neither be “classified” as users of 
CBDT nor as users of the Max-Heuristic, take significantly longer in the monopoly 
frame than in the abstract frame when current information is provided (Robust Rank 
Order Test, U = −3.1930, p = 0.0007). One explanation could be that subjects in the 
monopoly frame who do not use a “rule” to make their decisions try to figure out what 
Table 2.7  Observed frequencies of individual MSDs when 
comparing choices to PA and RL predictions. 
    
PA  
(MSD<1.5) 
RL      
MSD(<0.75) 
Monopoly w/ Current 69.2% (27/39) 25.6% (10.39) 
Monopoly w/o Current 73.3% (22/30) 20.0% (6/30) 
Abstract w/ Current 54.8% (17/31) 38.7% (12/31) 
Abstract w/o Current 71..9% (23/32) 28.1% (9/32) 
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certain symbols meant and how these are related to their profits. Such “calculations” are 






Figure 2.2 shows average earnings of the same set of people “categorized” in 
Figure 2.1. As expected (and in line with the calibration of the experiment) subjects 
guided by CBDT for more than two-thirds of their decisions earn similar amounts in 
either frame (Robust Rank Order Test, U = 0.9129, n.s.). This is also true for subjects 
who seem to employ the Max-Heuristic more than two-thirds of the time (Robust Rank 
Order Test, U = 0, n.s.). However, for the subjects “without” a rule, we find that they 
earn significantly more in the monopoly frame, when they also took more time (Robust 







We designed an experiment to test whether subjects use case based reasoning in an 
individual decision making environment. Our results provide some support for Case-
Based Decision Theory. This support did not depend on the framing of the problem. We 
also found support for a heuristic that was much simpler to use (and resulted in better 
payoffs). Very little is known about decision making procedures used in complex, 




FRAMING THE FIRST-PRICE AUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite being one of the simplest auction environments, the single-unit independent 
private values first-price auction has exhibited two intriguing stylized facts in laboratory 
studies. First, subjects typically bid more aggressively than predicted by the risk-neutral 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium (RNNE for short), resulting in significant reductions in their 
overall monetary earnings. In addition, the first-price auction may be implemented in 
two ways, as a sealed-bid or as a Dutch descending-clock auction. Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium theory suggests these should be isomorphic, giving identical results. Yet, 
bidding behavior in the Dutch implementation is significantly less aggressive22.  
 The seminal papers in this area include those of Coppinger et al. (1980), Cox et 
al. (1982), and Cox et al. (1988), with a substantial subsequent literature. Kagel (1995) 
provides a good survey and summary of the results and the theories put forward to 
explain them. Instead of testing these theories specifically, we return to these stylized 
facts from a new perspective, in which more careful consideration of the presentation 
and framing of these auctions plays a central part. Our design considers two aspects of 
framing in the first-price auction. 
We investigate the result that both auction implementations produce market 
prices in excess of the RNNE by presenting the games in the context of a custom-
designed graphical interface. This interface presents the information, action, and payoff 
spaces within a unified rectangular area, visually organizing the interrelations among 
private values, bids, and earnings. Our subjects make choices and receive feedback in 
the same frame, in keeping with principles of interaction design (e.g., Cooper and 
                                                 
22 We will use the term “first-price” auction to refer generically to the institution, with the term 
“implementation” referring to one of the ways in which the theoretical structure of the auction is realized. 
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Reimann, 2003). The graphical display is identical across implementations, except for 
the minimal changes necessary due to the rules of the games23. 
As a further control to keep the environments as similar as possible, and in view 
of the observations of Katok and Kwasnica (2003), we attempt to control for the 
opportunity cost of subjects’ time by choosing the speed of the clock in the Dutch 
auction in such a way that the typical period and session length for all implementations 
are approximately the same. We view the results of Katok and Kwasnica as an 
illustration of the importance of maintaining the dominance of the payoff implications of 
actions within the session (Smith, 1982). In a pilot session not reported in this paper, in 
which we did not institute this control, our subjects completed 80 sealed-bid auctions in 
about 30 minutes. In subsequent sealed-bid sessions, a common question was whether 
the session would end sooner, or if more periods would be conducted, if they “bid 
faster.” Thus, we view this control as a significant design feature for the purpose of 
testing isomorphism. 
The sessions reported in this paper consist of 60 auction periods, in which 
subjects participate in the same implementation throughout. This duration is announced 
to the subjects during the instructions for the session. This design feature has two 
objectives. First, with a large number of auction periods, the cumulative effects of 
suboptimal bidding, in terms of foregone earnings, will be more significant. Second, if 
the behavioral features of these auction environments arise largely from an initial 
misperception of the tradeoffs made in setting bids, a larger number of periods offers 
time for subjects to adapt. 
Our second framing treatment addresses more directly the difference in the 
extensive forms of the sealed and Dutch implementations. We contrast the way the 
uncertainty about other bidders’ values and bidding behavior is presented in these two 
games. Dorsey and Razzolini (2003) observe that the choice of a bid in the sealed 
implementation is similar to the choice of a lottery from a menu, where each lottery i in 
the menu has some probability pi of winning some prize qi, with a prize of zero 
                                                 
23 Specifically, subjects submit bids by clicking on the appropriate price in the sealed implementation, 
whereas they bid by clicking on a “Purchase” button in the Dutch. 
 27 
otherwise, such that the pi and qi have an inverse relationship. In the Dutch 
implementation, those same lotteries are presented in a sequential format. At each clock 
price, the bidder has two choices. He may purchase at the current price and earn an 
amount with certainty. (For simplicity, we neglect the possibility of a tie.) Alternatively, 
he may not purchase now; in this case, there is a high probability he will have another 
opportunity to purchase at a slightly better price at the next clock increment. We 
conjecture that the clock-based presentation helps bidders to recognize the tradeoff 
between probability of winning and the amount won, which is the essential tradeoff in 
the first-price auction. 
To investigate this, we introduce a synthetic implementation in which a clock 
counts down as in the Dutch implementation, but in which the outcome of the auction is 
not revealed until the clock reaches the lowest price. We will refer to this intermediate 
implementation as the “silent” implementation. It is functionally similar to the sealed 
implementation in terms of feedback, in that the results of the auction are not known 
until all choices are made. At the same time, it shares the property of the Dutch 
implementation in that it may cue the bidder to make assessments at the margin about 
the choice of bids. The silent implementation allows these to be separated to some 
degree. 
We find that we replicate the standard empirical regularities. The subjects bid 
significantly more than RNNE in all implementations, and subjects in the sealed 
implementation bid more aggressively than in the Dutch. We also find that both of these 
results persist over the session. The results of the silent implementation fall in between 
the sealed and Dutch: market prices typically exceed those in the Dutch, but are less than 
those in the sealed implementation.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the 
experimental sessions. Section 3 outlines the experimental results, both at the market and 





Each experimental session was conducted with 18 subjects recruited from the 
undergraduate student body at Texas A&M University. The 18 subjects were randomly 
grouped into two cohorts of 9 subjects each, labeled a and b. Within each cohort, 
subjects were randomly assigned in each period to one of three markets, each consisting 
of three subjects. The matching was done anonymously, and no subject ID numbers or 
other information about which subjects were participating in which markets in which 
periods was known to the subjects. All interaction among the subjects was mediated via 
computer in the Economic Research Laboratory at Texas A&M. 
The subjects participated in a uniform independent private values auction in each 
period. Subjects received a resale value for a single unit of a fictional commodity drawn 
from the range $0.15 to $6.00 in increments of $0.15; therefore, there were 40 possible 
resale values. The resale values were equally likely and drawn independently across 
periods and subjects. The subject who purchased the object earned the difference 
between her resale value and the market price; subjects who did not purchase the unit 
earned zero for the period. Ties were broken at random. Two sequences of private values 
and market assignments were used in all sessions, facilitating comparisons across 
implementations. The same sequence was assigned to cohort a in all sessions, and the 
other to cohort b. 
Bids were constrained to $0.10 increments, starting at $0.10; the maximum 
permitted bid was $6.20. The bid and value spaces were chosen so that in our 
environment it is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium to submit a bid equal to two-
thirds of the private value. This is the analog of the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium of the first-price auction with risk-neutral bidders when values are 
distributed uniformly and the permitted bids are the nonnegative real numbers. 
Figure 3.1 shows a screenshot of the subject interface presenting the results of a 
period. Subjects used the rectangle on the left of the screen to interact with the market. 
All decisions were made in this area, and feedback from the results of the period was 
presented in the same area. In the sealed implementation, subjects observed the 
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realization of their private value, and submitted a bid by clicking on the corresponding 
area of the market rectangle. In the Dutch implementation, a clock price was displayed, 
which started at $6.20 and decreased by $0.10 each second; once a subject clicked the 
button to purchase the object, the clock stopped for that market and the results were 
displayed to all participants in that market. The silent implementation operates as the 
Dutch does, except the clock price decreases to zero in every period, with no feedback 
regarding the outcome of the market given until that time. Subjects were permitted to 
submit bids, or click to purchase, above their resale value in all implementations. 
At the right of the screen is a record sheet, that summarized the subject’s history, 
including their private values and bids, the market prices in the markets in which they 
participated, and their history of earnings. The subjects did not observe the results of 
other markets in which they did not participate. Since the design investigates the 
isomorphism between the sealed-bid and Dutch implementations, in order to keep 
information constant across implementations, no information regarding how others bid 
was presented, since that is not available in the Dutch implementation. The record sheet 
by default displayed the results of the last 25 periods, with scroll buttons available for 
subjects to review the  results from earlier in the session. 
The clock speed in the Dutch and silent implementations was chosen with two 
goals in mind. First, the clock ticked slowly enough that subjects could click to purchase 
while the clock was at their desired price with a high degree of accuracy24. Second, the 
clock speed was such that the overall length of the clock-based sessions would be 
roughly comparable to the sealed sessions.  
The subjects participated in 60 periods, and the length of the session was 
announced during the instructions. Three sessions of each implementation were 
conducted. No subject participated in more than one session, and none had any prior 
experience in an auction environment at Texas A&M. The instructions were read aloud 
from a projector screen while subjects followed along on the screen at their stations.  
                                                 
24 We implemented “practice” round during the instructions during which subjects were asked to “stop” 
the clock at a given price. No subject experienced any difficulty doing so. Thus we believe, at least in the 
vast majority of cases, that the subjects were able to register their desire to stop the clock and buy the 





After the instructions were completed, subjects answered a questionnaire, which was 
checked for correctness by an experimenter. The answers were then reviewed aloud, 





Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for overall market performance in each of the 18 
cohorts. Each cohort contains 180 market observations (60 periods × 3 markets per 
period). The analysis of market performance takes the cohort as the smallest unit of 
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independent observation, and we characterize performance based upon statistics 
aggregated at the cohort level.  
 
 
Table 3.1  Statistics on market performance for all 18 cohorts. 
  (a) Market/Theory  (b) Market vs Theory  (c) Efficiency 
Type Cohort 1-10 6-15 51-60   Above Equal Below   Freq Percent 
Sealed 1a 1.295 1.299 1.296  168 3 9  86.1 98.1 
 1b 1.390 1.311 1.264  175 2 3  91.7 98.6 
 2a 1.356 1.350 1.238  179 2 0  92.8 99.4 
 2b 1.269 1.290 1.251  169 2 9  91.1 98.7 
 3a 1.301 1.261 1.257  175 2 3  90.0 98.8 
 3b 1.310 1.300 1.289  178 0 2  92.2 99.0 
 Mean 1.320 1.302 1.266  173.8 1.8 4.3  90.7 98.8 
            
Dutch 1a 1.173 1.185 1.194  160 7 13  86..1 97.7 
 1b 1.257 1.244 1.237  174 3 3  88.9 98.3 
 2a 1.120 1.144 1.123  140 7 33  82.2 96.6 
 2b 1.263 1.150 1.188  150 8 22  88.3 98.5 
 3a 1.195 1.094 1.041  136 5 39  81.1 96.7 
 3b 1.222 1.209 1.230  170 3 7  87.8 98.5 
 Mean 1.205 1.171 1.169  155 5.5 19.5  85.7 97.7 
            
Silent 1a 1.249 1.271 1.248  166 3 11  92.8 99.1 
 1b 1.294 1.282 1.307  164 6 10  91.7 99.2 
 2a 1.325 1.193 1.170  178 0 2  87.2 98.5 
 2b 1.190 1.192 1.181  158 12 10  91.1 98.8 
 3a 1.423 1.287 1.267  167 2 11  91.1 98.2 
 3b 1.231 1.220 1.182  176 3 1  88.3 98.3 
  Mean 1.285 1.241 1.226   168.2 4.3 7.5   90.4 98.7 
 
 
We relate observed market prices to the RNNE prediction in two ways. To 
provide an overall indicator of how market prices typically compare to theory, for each 
market observation we construct the ratio of the market price to the RNNE theory price. 
We then report the average of this ratio for 10-period increments in order to summarize 
its evolution. This evolution is plotted for each of the 18 cohorts in Figure 3.2, and 
values for selected groups of periods are presented in part (a) in Table 3.1. Because we 
are interested in changes in market price over time, ratios for the first ten and last ten 
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periods are shown. Since there were no practice periods, there may have been some 
early-period confusion about the rules of the game. To focus on how the markets evolve 
once a common understanding of the game has been established, we also present the 
ratios for periods 6 through 15.  
Since average rates may be influenced by particular markets with atypical results, 
we also categorize each market by whether the observed market price exceeds, equals, or 
is less than the RNNE prediction. These counts are presented in part (b) of Table 3.1. By 
all the measures, the averages across cohorts order the implementations the same way, 
with sealed having the highest prices, Dutch the lowest, and silent in between. Also, the 
average market to theory ratios drop over time in all three implementations. We now 
formalize and test the significance of these observations. 
Result 1. Prices exceed the risk-neutral prediction in a significant majority of 
markets in all implementations. 
Clearly, the RNNE point prediction is not a tenable hypothesis given the data. A 
more generous hypothesis is that market prices are equally likely to fall above or below 
RNNE. We form a test statistic by computing for each cohort the number of markets 
exceeding RNNE minus the number in which the market price is less than RNNE. We 
reject the null hypothesis that the mean of this statistic is zero, against the two-sided 
alternative, for all implementations, with p-values 10−8 for sealed, 10−4 for Dutch, and 





Result 2. Prices are significantly higher in the sealed than in the Dutch. The 
difference in prices is persistent throughout all periods. 
The phenomenon of higher prices in the sealed implementation is persistent in 
this environment, even when subjects are given the opportunity to participate in 60 
market periods. We ask whether the market-to-theory ratios are significantly different 
across implementations at various points in the session. We are interested both in initial 
differences, as well as whether differences tend to diminish over time.  
For each implementation, our statistic is the mean across cohorts of the ratios 
reported in part (a) of Table 3.1. We test the null hypothesis of equality against the two-
sided alternative, using a two-sample t-test. The p-values for these tests are shown in 
Table 3.2. Cohorts using the Dutch implementation give significantly lower market-to-
theory ratios throughout the session when compared to the sealed implementation. While 
in point estimate terms, the Dutch cohorts also exhibit lower ratios than the cohorts using 
the silent implementation, the differences are only significant at the .05 level in periods 
6-15.  
 
Table 3.2  p-values for two-sample t-test on market 
to theory ratios (across implementations, over three 
selected groups of periods). 
  Periods 
Comparing   1-10 6-15 51-60 
Sealed - Dutch  0.0026 0.00081 0.023 
Sealed - Silent  0.390 0.0213 0.153 
Silent - Dutch   0.0786 0.0336 0.168 
 
 
Result 3. Market price adjustment within a session is minimal. 
The across-cohort tests of Result 2 could mask significant trends within cohorts. To 
focus on within-cohort changes, we construct for each cohort the difference between the 
ratio in periods 1-10 and periods 51-60. We test the null hypothesis that the mean of 
these ratios for an implementation is zero, against the two-sided alternative. We repeat 
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the process, using periods 6-15 instead of periods 1-10. Table 3.3 presents the p-values 
for these t-tests.  
 
Table 3.3  p-values for paired t-test of early versus 
late price ratios (with null hypothesis of equal ratios 
against two-sided alternative). 
Implementation   Periods p-value 
 1-10 vs 51-60 0.058 
Sealed 
 6-15 vs 51-60 0.088 
 1-10 vs 51-60 0.243 
Dutch 
 6-15 vs 51-60 0.876 
 1-10 vs 51-60 0.118 
Silent 
  6-15 vs 51-60 0.147 
 
 
Only the sealed implementation shows statistically significant evidence of 
decline in the ratio of market to RNNE prices. Even though overall prices decrease on 
average in all implementations, there is much more variation across cohorts in the clock-
based implementations, leading to the insignificance of the tests. In fact, a striking 
feature of Figure 3.2 is that there is much more dispersion in the levels of these ratios 
across cohorts in the clock-based implementations than in the sealed implementation.  
Result 4. All implementations result in high levels of efficiency, significantly 
exceeding the efficiency predictions of a zero-intelligence random bidding model. The 
Dutch implementation is less efficient than the other two. 
The efficiency of these markets can be measured in two ways: the percentage of 
gains from exchange realized, and the frequency with which the highest-value bidder 
purchased the object. Part (c) of Table 3.1 summarizes the two efficiency measures for 
each cohort. To obtain a useful baseline for interpreting these levels, we consider a 
model of “zero-intelligence” (ZI) random bidding patterned after that of Gode and 
Sunder (1993) for continuous-time double-auction markets, and Cason and Friedman 
(1997) for call markets. In our environment, we operationalize the model by assuming 
bidders choose all individually-rational bids with equal probability. Simulation results 
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for this zero-intelligence model give a percentage efficiency of 89.4% and a frequency 
of efficient allocation of 64.3%. 
Formally, we construct the average frequency of efficient allocation, and average 
percentage efficiency, for each implementation. We then perform two- sample t-tests for 
each pair of implementations, testing the null of equality against the two-sided 
alternative, for both measures. We also perform t-tests of these measures against the ZI 
predictions, again with the null of equality against the two-sided alternative. p-values for 
all tests are reported in Table 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.4  p-values for  t-tests on efficiency measures. 
  Frequency Percentage 
    Silent Dutch ZI Silent Dutch ZI 
Sealed  0.892 0.016 10-6 0.741 0.033 10-8 
Silent   0.019 10-7  0.044 10-6 
Dutch       10-5     10-6 
 
 
Thus, observed efficiencies do significantly exceed those generated by random 
bidding behavior. The sealed and silent implementations are statistically 
indistinguishable, but both are significantly more efficient than the Dutch by both 
measures.  
Even though overall the silent and sealed implementations result in almost 
exactly the same number of inefficient allocations, the markets in which misallocations 
occur are not the same. Figure 3.3 presents a boxplot of the distribution of the highest 
value in the market among the markets in which misallocation occurred. For 
comparison, “All Markets” plots the distribution of the highest value for all markets in 
the two cohorts. Inefficient allocation happens more often in the sealed implementation 
when the highest value in the market is closer to the top of the interval of possible 
private values. In contrast, the distribution for the silent and Dutch look much more like 







Result 5. In all implementations, bidders leave significant amounts of earnings 
“on the table” due to bidding more aggressively than risk-neutral. 
Summary statistics for subject earnings are presented in Table 3.5, along with the 
predictions assuming all subjects bid according to the RNNE strategy25. For comparison, 
we take the RNNE bidding function as an alternative heuristic which any bidder might 
have unilaterally chosen. In the sealed implementation, the mean earnings loss over the 
session relative to this benchmark was $7.93; for the silent implementation, the mean 
                                                 
25 The earnings totals presented are for the contingent portion of the experiment only, and do not include 
the $10.00 participation fee 
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earnings loss was $7.3826. Thus, most bidders would have been significantly better off 
unilaterally using this simple, less aggressive heuristic, even holding constant aggressive 
bidding by other subjects.  
 
 
Table 3.5  Summary statistics for distribution of subject 
earnings, by implementation. The theory column refers to 
the predictions for the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.  
    Sealed Silent Dutch Theory 
Mean  $12.86 $14.96 $17.65 $30.34 
Median  $12.45 $15.03 $17.90 $29.81 
Minimum  $7.25 $3.04 $6.70 $23.10 
Maximum  $29.25 $30.00 $33.15 $42.10 
Subjects   54 54 54   
 
 
Result 6. After winning an auction, bidders frequently, though not always, 
change bids in accordance with directional learning (Selten and Buchta, 1998). 
Directional learning fits the data better in the clock-based implementations. 
Directional learning implies that a bidder who wins the object in one period 
would adjust his bid function at his realized private value downward, since he almost 
certainly could have won the object at a lower price. Although we do not directly 
observe bid functions, there are 26 instances in each session in which a bidder receives 
the same resale value in two consecutive periods. For these instances, we examine 
whether the bidder’s behavior between those periods is consistent with the directional 
learning hypothesis. Because independence assumptions across observations in the same 
session may not be appropriate, we summarize our observations without performing 
formal statistical tests. 
Table 3.6 summarizes the data on how bidders set their bids when receiving the 
same value as in the previous period. In an environment using the strategy method to 
elicit entire bid functions, Selten and Buchta (1998) report substantial inertia; more than 
                                                 
26 Because only winning bids are observed in the Dutch, we cannot construct this counterfactual. 
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80 percent of the time their subjects did not adjust their bid function in response to the 
outcome of the previous period. We observe the opposite; with a similar frequency our 
subjects do change their bidding behavior27. Along with Selten and Buchta, we find that 
when the subjects do change their bids, they generally do so in the direction that 
directional learning predicts. Our results more closely parallel Cason and Friedman 
(1997), who also find evidence in favor of directional learning in a double-auction call 
market. 
 
Table 3.6  Bidder reaction to winning an auction and having the same 
value draw the next period. Numbers in parentheses are percentages.  
    Increase Same Decrease 
Sealed  6 (16.7%) 10 (27.8%) 20 (55.6%) 
Silent  4 (11.4%) 5 (14.3%) 26 (74.3%) 
Dutch  0 (0.0%) 6 (24.0%) 19 (76.0%) 
Dutch (worst case)   7 (21.9%) 6 (18.8%) 19 (59.4%) 
 
 
The implementation may have some effect on the frequency with which subjects 
change their bids. In the silent implementation we observe less inertia and a greater 
frequency of decreasing bids after having won the previous period. A similar pattern 
appears in the Dutch implementation. There is a censoring bias in the Dutch 
implementation, since it is possible to win the auction in one period, and then lose the 
next period because the market price increases due to another bidder purchasing at a 
higher price. In these cases, we do not observe what the subject would have done. The 
worst case for directional learning is that in each of these instances, the bidder was in 
fact intending to increase his bid. The row in Table 3.6 labeled “Dutch (worst case)” 
presents the data assuming the bidder would have increased his bid in all 7 of these 
                                                 
27 We conjecture that this result is driven by a bias in the design of Selten and Buchta’s interface. In their 
design, subjects submit the same bid function as the previous period with a single mouse click, but had to 
redraw the entire bid function to modify any part of it. In our implementation, the amount of work to set 
the bid in the subsequent period is the same regardless of whether or not the subject changes their behavior 
relative to the previous period. 
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cases. Even with this extreme assumption, the data generally favor the directional 
learning hypothesis. 
Result 7. There is no apparent trend, either individually or in aggregate, in how 
bidders change bidding behavior over time. There is weak evidence that bidders exhibit 
less inertia in the silent implementation than the sealed. 
We consider cases in which the same subject received the same resale value in 
two different periods, within a span of 25 periods. Additionally, we require that the 
resale value was at least $3.00, to restrict attention to behavior in cases where the bidder 
likely believes he has a realistic chance of purchasing the object. Since we are interested 
in the overall bidding trends, we do not distinguish whether the subject won the auction 
in the earlier period of the pair; we simply ask whether the bidder chose a higher, lower, 
or the same bid in the later period than in the earlier one. 
We use the silent implementation as a proxy for how subjects react to the clock-
based presentation, since we do not observe behavior in the Dutch for bidders who do 
not win the auction. The data for the 54 subjects in the sealed and the 54 in the silent 
implementation are represented in the simplices in Figure 3.4. A subject’s location on 
these barycentric plots is determined by the frequency with which he raised, lowered, or 
did not change his bid in the period pairs. Graphically, points closer to the apex of the 
simplex represent bidders who exhibited more inertia, that is, who more often submitted 
the same bid in both periods of the pair. Points to the left of the vertical line are bidders 
who, conditional on having changed their bid, increased their bid more often than 
decreased it28. 
The points cluster lower in the simplex for the silent implementation, indicating 
that typically bidders tended to change their bids more often in the silent implementation 
than in the sealed implementation. In terms of the representation in Figure 3.4, for any 
                                                 
28 Of the 18 value sequences in the parameter set, the number of period pairs satisfying our restriction 
ranges from 6 to 14, with a mean of 10.8 and a median of 11.5. In the sealed implementation, we observe 
23 bidders who increased their bid in the second period of the pair more often than decreased it, and 26 
bidders who decreased more often than increased, with 5 bidders equally likely to go either way 
conditional on making a change. In the silent treatment, 22 bidders increase more often than decreased, 
and 26 decreased more often than increased, with 5 bidders equally likely to adjust in either direction. 
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line drawn horizontally across the two simplices at the same height, there are more 
bidders whose points fall on or below that line in the silent implementation graph than in 









We replicate two empirical regularities in laboratory first-price auctions with private 
values. A sealed implementation generates higher market prices than a Dutch 
implementation, even though the two are considered isomorphic in theory. Furthermore, 
both implementations give market prices in excess of those predicted by risk-neutral 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
Our design extends these replications in some new directions. These differences 
are persistent over a session of 60 market periods. Thus, advance knowledge of the 
relatively large number of periods does not seem to encourage subjects to recognize that 
bidding less aggressively is in fact (expected) earnings-enhancing, nor does repetition of 
the auctions lead to this realization. In addition, an interface in which the magnitude of 
earnings is prominently displayed in the feedback space does not encourage subjects to 
bid less aggressively. Finally, we observe that there is more heterogeneity among price 
levels in cohorts using the Dutch relative to those using the sealed implementation. 
To investigate the differences further, we introduce an intermediate synthetic 
implementation in which the market operates like the Dutch auction with a descending 
clock, but in which the choices of the bidders are not revealed until the clock reaches the 
lowest price, simulating a sealed bid. We find that market prices in this implementation 
generally lie between those generated by the Dutch and the sealed, while maintaining the 
heterogeneous across-cohort behavior observed in the Dutch implementation. 
We use the fact that we observe all bids in the silent implementation to 
investigate how subjects respond and adapt over the course of the session. Subjects 
tended to make changes in their bidding behavior more often in the silent 
implementation, compared to the sealed29. This could occur because subjects are cued to 
think more carefully about the consequences at the margin of purchasing at the current 
price, versus risking another tick of the clock. However, there is no indication of 
                                                 
29 While we did not make systematic records, our observations during the session were that the body 
language and reactions of subjects in the clock-based sessions were different than in the sealed-bid. 
Subjects were generally more likely to be leaning forward and studying the screen intently during the 
clock treatments, and to react to the results visibly, while subjects in the sealed implementation often 
sprawled or reclined in their chairs. 
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systematic learning in the sense of decreasing bids. Even though recruiting procedures 
were identical, the two clock-based implementations exhibit more heterogeneity across 
cohorts in both the level of prices, and the way those prices adapt over time, than the 
sealed implementation. This suggests that, in addition to the institutional effects on the 
level of prices reported in previous work, there is more heterogeneity, at least in our 
subject population, in the perception of how to bid in the clock-based implementations. 
Finally, we conclude with a few casual observations. When we distributed 
screenshots of the instructions to the subjects, we instructed them that they were “free to 
mark up those pages in whatever way they might find helpful.” While most subjects 
made no marks or doodled, a few chose to attempt certain forms of market analysis. A 
few subjects chose to track their earnings per minute, which we interpreted as further 
evidence that controlling the length of the session is a significant aspect of testing the 
isomorphism. No subjects tracked the most relevant datum - the distribution of the 
market prices they observed - though several attempted to approximate the average 
market price. However, among those subjects, none attempted to distinguish periods in 
which they purchased the object from those in which they did not. Note that those 
market statistics, then, are generated by the maximum bid out of three bids, whereas in 
computing an optimal bid in a three-bidder market, the subject is interested in the 
assessed distribution of the maximum bid out of the two other bids in the market. While 
we do not assert a direct link between these statistics and the way those bidders 
formulated their bids, we note that failure to correct for one’s own effect on the history 
of market prices would also lead to more aggressive bidding. 
Dorsey and Razzolini (2003) investigate bidding behavior against robots 
programmed to bid according to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium in four bidder sealed-
bid auctions. They consider treatments in which the interface does compute the 
probability of winning with any given bid, and those in which it does not. For high 
realizations of the private value, the range for which the choice of bid is most important, 
they find that giving the subjects the probability of winning makes bidding less 
aggressive. Their results are consistent with the hypothesis that when subjects generate 
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impressions of the pattern of market prices, they fail to correct for the fact they 
themselves are part of the process that generates those market prices.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESERVATION VALUES IN LABORATORY AUCTIONS: 
CONTEXT AND BIDDING BEHAVIOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Laboratory experiments in economics intermediate between pure theory and empirical 
observations in the field. In the lab, experimenters observe the decisions of real, human 
agents, while being able to control at least some environmental variables. Whether 
implicitly or explicitly, experimenters deal in two kinds of mappings: the mapping 
between a theoretical model and the laboratory environment, and the mapping between a 
field environment and its laboratory counterpart. The usefulness of laboratory results in 
improving theoretical models and in understanding field behavior depends on the 
validity of these mappings. In the terminology of the recent survey of Schram (2005), 
these can be thought of as the “internal validity” and the “external validity,” 
respectively, of a design. The interplay among theory, lab, and field is particularly 
evident in auction markets. Results of laboratory auctions have been used to refine 
auction models and theories of bidding (Cox et al., 1988), and have informed the design 
of mechanisms in the world at large (for example, Roth, 2002).  
The strategic consideration faced by a bidder in a private-values first-price 
auction is a price-probability tradeoff. A higher bid increases the probability of winning 
the auction, but decreases the surplus the bidder gains when he wins, because he pays a 
higher price. Theoretical models assume agents reason about this price-probability 
tradeoff. In the field, it is taken as a given that they do. The validity of a private-values, 
first-price auction experiment depends on the salience of this tradeoff to the subjects.  
In the lab, a robust finding is that subjects bid significantly more aggressively 
than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayes-Nash equilibrium. (See the survey of Kagel, 
1995 for cites and discussion.) We argue that this finding is an artifact of the standard 
method for inducing incentives in these experiments. Using an alternate presentation of 
the incentives, in which subjects are paid according to the total consumer surplus they 
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generate, we find that bidding is significantly less aggressive, even though the risk-
neutral Nash equilibrium prediction is unchanged.  
This result is most closely related to the findings reported by Isaac and James 
(2000). In a within-subjects design, they show that the level of risk aversion implied by a 
subject's choice in the BDM mechanism is often quite different from the level implied by 
that subject's bidding behavior in a private-values first-price auction against simulated 
bidders. Furthermore, the ranking of subjects from most to least risk-averse differs 
substantially between the BDM and first-price auction tasks. These tasks, while 
isomorphic in the eyes of the decision theorist, are framed sufficiently differently that 
subjects may bring different heuristics to bear on the two tasks. Our results obtain within 
the same institutional space, in that subjects participate in a first-price auction in both 
treatments.  
In evaluating an institution's performance, an objective of the experimental 
method is to separate regularities which are inherent to the institution from observations 
which are artifacts of experimental design. In the language of Smith (2002), interpreting 
laboratory results assumes that a set of auxiliary hypotheses relating to the 
implementation of the experiment hold. The validity of these auxiliary hypotheses 
cannot be directly observed, but their plausibility can be assessed in part by considering 
modifications to an experimental protocol.  
In the context of understanding individual preferences and choice behavior, Plott 
and Zeiler (2005) investigate the “willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap,” the 
claim that there is a systematic difference between the amount a subject is willing to pay 
for an object and the amount for which he is willing to sell the same object. They show 
that the gap can be turned on and off by the choice of experimental procedure. They note 
that “this variation in experimental results undermines the claim that the gap is a 
fundamental feature of human preferences.” Our result is analogous in showing that the 
bidding behavior reported in the literature is not a fundamental institutional feature of 
the first-price private-values auction in the laboratory.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the design choices leading 
to our presentation of the auction environment. Section 3 describes the experimental 
protocols, and Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.  
 
PRESENTING AUCTION ENVIRONMENTS IN THE LABORATORY 
The first-price auction with a single, indivisible object for sale is generally modeled as a 
Bayesian game, in the tradition of Vickrey (1961). In the independent private values 
version, each bidder has a private, idiosyncratic reservation value for the object. These 
values are independently distributed over some interval, and the distribution is common 
knowledge. The bidders submit bids simultaneously (in a first-price sealed-bid auction) 
or using a clock mechanism (in the Dutch auction), and the highest bidder purchases the 
object. If bidders are risk-neutral, the payoff to the winning bidder is the difference 
between his reservation value and the price he pays. The utility of the outcome for 
bidders who do not purchase is normalized to zero.  
This environment, with the private values drawn from a uniform distribution, has 
been studied extensively in the laboratory. In this literature, reservation values are 
presented using the methods and terminology developed in Coppinger et al., (1980), Cox 
et al., (1982), and Cox et al., (1988). The instructions describe the reservation value as a 
cash “resale value.” The bidder who purchases the fictitious object on auction sells it 
back to the experimenter for this amount, and earns the difference between the resale 
value and the price he pays in the auction. Bidders who do not purchase the object 
receive monetary earnings of zero.  
The resale value protocol uses a direct translation of the utility function from the 
standard auction model, where the reservation value is motivated by the artifice of the 
subject selling the object back to the experimenter. This translation is straightforward 
and clear to anyone familiar with the standard auction model, but may not communicate 
the nature of the experimental task to a non-specialist in the same way. In the context of 
their decision task, Plott and Zeiler comment that “[d]ecision theorists might find the 
language used to describe procedures to be very clear because they are trained to give an 
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operational meaning to technical language.” Therefore, we consider a different way to 
make the concept of a reservation value operational to our non-specialist subjects.  
In the field, a reservation value may be determined by the existence of 
opportunities to purchase a close substitute outside the auction market. Consider a 
consumer who wishes to purchase an iPod. iPods are frequently sold on Internet auction 
sites such as eBay. iPods are also widely available at electronics stores. Suppose the 
consumer has already made the decision to purchase an iPod, but is willing to try an 
online auction to get a better deal than is available locally. If the consumer fails to win 
the eBay auction, he then purchases locally. The implied reservation value generated by 
the possibility of store purchase varies across consumers. Posted prices at stores may 
depend on geographic location. In addition, consumers differ in the cost of traveling to a 
store, due to physical distance or opportunity cost of personal time. Thus, consumers 
have idiosyncratic private reservation values.  
Regardless of where he purchases, though, the consumer engages in an economic 
activity that is essentially the same. In either case, he purchases an iPod at a price lower 
than his maximum willingness to pay, and he earns positive consumer surplus. The only 
distinction between winning and not winning the eBay auction is the price he actually 
pays in the end. Thus, there is a parallel structure between the two outcomes. More 
generally, if a consumer does not purchase an object in an auction, he will instead 
participate in some other gainful exchange with the unspent money.  
The standard scheme for presenting reservation values does not maintain this 
parallel structure. Instructions for these experiments necessarily distinguish between 
how earnings are calculated in the case in which the subject wins the auction, versus 
when the subject does not. When the earnings for not winning are set to zero, there is a 
textual difference in the presentation of the earnings calculation. Specifically, when a 
subject wins, earnings are computed according to a formula like “resale value minus 
purchase price.” When a subject does not win, no formula is needed; his earnings are 
zero.  
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Thus, earnings are positive if and only if the subject is successful in increasing 
consumer surplus. This further emphasizes the dichotomous presentation by segregating 
the outcomes into those with positive earnings versus those with zero earnings. There is 
one, and only one, way to earn positive earnings in the experiment: win. Discussions we 
have led following classroom auction experiments suggest that subjects do take note of 
the dichotomy and use it as an input in their decision-making process. Despite using 
neutral terminology, such as “market” instead of “auction” and “purchase” instead of 
“win,” students frequently indicate they chose their bids to “try to win” the auction, or to 
avoid “getting no payoff This undermines the salience of the tradeoff an expected 
earnings-maximizing bidder would make between the probability of purchasing the 
object versus the consumer surplus from that purchase.  
Section 3 presents a design for presenting private values which maintains the 
parallel presentation of the outcomes in the auction. All bidders have an identical 
maximum willingness to pay for the object. Each bidder receives an idiosyncratic 
outside price. This outside price serves as the reservation value from the theoretical 
model. The winning bidder purchases the object in the auction at his bid. The other 
bidders purchase the object elsewhere at their respective outside prices.  
This design presents the outcomes in a way which is both textually and 
conceptually parallel. In each period, every subject purchases an object. Earnings are 
always computed using the formula “maximum willingness to pay minus the price paid,” 
that is, the consumer surplus. The only difference between the outcomes is how the price 
paid is determined. All subjects earn a positive amount each period, so the two outcomes 
are no longer distinguishable based on whether earnings are positive or zero.  
 
DESIGN 
We report results on three sessions in each of four cells of a 2×2 design, for a total of 12 
experimental sessions. One dimension manipulates the presentation of the reservation 
value, one treatment using the standard “resale value” method and the other using an 
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“outside price” frame. The second dimension varies the choice of auction 
implementation between the sealed-bid and Dutch mechanisms.  
Each cohort consisted of 9 subjects recruited from the undergraduate student 
body at Texas A&M University; no subject participated in more than one session. All 
interaction among the subjects was mediated via computer in the Economic Research 
Laboratory at Texas A&M. In each of 60 periods, the subjects were randomly matched 
into three markets, each with three subjects. The number of periods was announced in 
the instructions. The matching was done anonymously, and no subject ID numbers or 
other information about which subjects were participating in which markets in which 
periods was known to the subjects. At the end of each period, subjects only found out the 
market price; no information about non-winning bids was revealed.  
The design extends the protocol from Turocy et al., (2007). In each period, each 
subject received a reservation value drawn uniformly from the set {$0.15, $0.30, …, 
$5.85, $6.00}. These were drawn independently across subjects and across periods. In 
sessions using the standard “resale value” (RV) method for presenting reservation 
values, the instructions read  
Your Earnings for a period will depend on whether you purchase the 
commodity in your market, and on the Market Price.  
If you purchase a unit of the commodity, your earnings for that period 
will be calculated according to the equation  
Your Earnings = Resale Value - Market Price  
If you do not purchase a unit of the commodity, then your earnings for 
that period will be zero.  
In the “outside price” (OP) treatment, this text was replaced with the language  
You will purchase exactly one unit of the commodity each period. If you 
purchase the unit of the commodity in the market, your earnings for that 
period will be calculated as  
Your Earnings = $6.20 - Market Price  
If you do not purchase the unit of the commodity in the market, then you 
will purchase a unit outside the market at your Outside Price. Your 
Earnings for the period are then computed as  
Your Earnings = $6.20 - Outside Price  
Bids in the sealed-bid, and clock increments in the Dutch, were restricted to the set 
{$0.10, $0.20, …, $6.10, $6.20}. In both the RV and OP treatments, it is a symmetric 
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium for risk-neutral bidders to bid 2/3 of their signal. To allow 
comparability across sessions, the same sequence of reservation values and matching 
into markets was used. In the “resale value” sessions, subjects received the sum of their 
earnings for all 60 periods. To maintain the same level of expected earnings given the 
same bidding behavior, for the “outside price” sessions, subjects were paid their earnings 
from 7 of the 60 periods, which were drawn at random at the end of the session.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We organize our data analysis around three principal results.  
1. Market prices are significantly lower in the outside price sessions.  
2. Individual bidding behavior in the sealed-bid is significantly less aggressive in 
the outside price sessions.  
3. Market prices are lower in the Dutch than the sealed-bid using both methods of 
presenting the reservation value.  
 
 
Table 4.1  Statistics on market performance for all cohorts. Cohorts labeled RV used the resale value frame; 
those labeled OP used the outside price frame. 
  (a) Market/Theory  (b) Market vs Theory 
Type Cohort 1-10 6-15 51-60   Above Equal Below Within 0.20 
Sealed RV-1 1.295 1.299 1.296  168 3 9 13 
 RV-2 1.356 1.350 1.238  179 2 0 4 
 RV-3 1.301 1.261 1.257  175 2 3 13 
 Mean 1.320 1.302 1.266  173.8 1.8 4.3 10.0 
 OP-1 1.113 1.200 1.144  147 8 25 41 
 OP-2 1.130 1.197 1.182  142 7 31 46 
 OP-3 1.219 1.198 1.100  117 6 47 42 
 Mean 1.154 1.198 1.142  135.5 7.0 34.3 43.0 
          
Dutch RV-1 1.173 1.185 1.194  160 7 13 31 
 RV-2 1.120 1.144 1.123  140 7 33 43 
 RV-3 1.195 1.094 1.041  136 5 39 49 
 Mean 1.205 1.171 1.169  155 5.5 19.5 41 
 OP-1 0.867 0.961 1.089  93 19 68 70.0 
 OP-2 1.025 1.029 1.087  117 11 52 59 
 OP-3 1.069 1.037 1.019  102 19 59 63 
  Mean 0.987 1.009 1.065   104.0 16.3 59.7 64.0 
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Result 1. Market prices are significantly lower in both sealed-bid and Dutch 
under OP.  
We evaluate market performance relative to the risk-neutral Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium (RNNE) benchmark. First, for each market in each period, we compute the 
ratio of the realized market price to the RNNE prediction. If the realized price equals the 
theory price, this ratio is 1. Figure 4.1 plots ten-period moving averages of the market-
to-theory ratio. The RV cohorts are plotted as solid lines, and the OP cohorts as dashed 
lines. In the sealed-bid, the treatment effect is visually significant. The time series for all 
cohorts using OP lie everywhere below those using RV. In the Dutch, the effect is most 
evident early in the sessions. In contrast to the other three treatments, the time trend in 
the Dutch under OP is upwards.  
Table 4.1 reports market-level results for the twelve cohorts. The six cohorts 
using RV are those reported as cohorts a in Turocy et al., (2007). Part (a) of Table 4.1 
contains averages of the market-to-theory ratio for each cohort across three ten-period 
intervals: periods 1-10, periods 6-15, and periods 51-60. The average across cohorts for 
the market-to-theory ratio is higher for each interval under RV than under OP. We 
formally test this with the null hypothesis that the average ratio across cohorts is equal, 
versus the two-sided alternative. For the sealed-bid cohorts, we reject this null 
hypothesis for each interval (p-values .020 for periods 1-10, .055 for periods 6-15, and 
.017 for periods 51-60). For the Dutch, we can reject the null hypothesis for periods 1-10 
(p-value .090) and 6-15 (p-value .021), but we cannot reject the null of equality late in 
the sessions (p-value .355 for periods 51-60).  
We conjecture that the upward price trend in the Dutch sessions arises because 
experimentation is relatively inexpensive under OP. There is only a 7 in 60 chance a 
period will be selected to count towards earnings. Even if it is selected, the bidder still 
receives positive earnings for that period, irrespective of whether he wins the auction. A 
savvy first-period strategy is to submit the minimum bid of $0.10 independent of the 
reservation value the bidder receives. This strategy provides the most information about 





Because only the winning bid is reported, winning the auction is informationally 
costly. If the bidder does not win the auction, he learns the maximum of the other two 
bids submitted in his market; if he does win the auction, he learns only that the 
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maximum of the other two bids was less than his bid. The usefulness of this 
experimentation might be more transparent in the Dutch implementation, as the clock-
based presentation might suggest the idea of playing a waiting game, or game of 
chicken, in the first few periods.  
Another way to compare the observed market prices to theory is to ask how often 
the market price was greater than or less than the RNNE prediction. For each cohort, 
counts of these events are presented in group (b) in Table 4.1. In both sealed-bid and 
Dutch, the RNNE prediction comes closer to being a “median” prediction under OP. To 
operationalize this, we test the null hypothesis that the average across cohorts of the 
proportion of markets where price exceeds RNNE is the same between RV and OP, 
against the two-sided alternative. This null hypothesis is rejected for both the sealed-bid 
(p-value 0.043) and Dutch (p-value 0.016).  
Finally, one can ask how often the RNNE prediction gives a reasonable estimate 
of the realized market prices. The final column in Table 4.1 counts the number of 
markets in each cohort in which the market price falls within 20 cents of the RNNE 
prediction. This is within two bid increments in the sealed-bid, or two clock ticks in the 
Dutch. The mean number of markets in a cohort satisfying this criterion is higher under 
OP (p-values 0.0023 for the sealed-bid and 0.029 for the Dutch, using the two-sided 
alternative).  
Result 2. Across subjects, individual bidding behavior in the sealed-bid is less 
aggressive under OP.  
We estimate the linear model  
bidi s t = αi s + βi s×valuei s t + εi s t                (4.1) 
for each bidder i in each cohort s, where t denotes the period number. The left panel of 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of estimated bid function slopes β under OP and RV. 
Under RV, the estimated slopes range from 0.67 to 0.98, with a median of 0.82. This 
median is consistent with findings in, for example, Cox et al., (1988), who report a 
“typical” slope of 0.835, and Katok and Kwasnica (2003), who report 0.807. Under OP, 
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the slopes range from 0.47 to 0.98, with a median of 0.71. Only three slopes under RV 
are less than the median slope under OP, and only one slope under OP exceeds 0.85.  
We also propose a more stringent test of the theory, by computing the percentage 
of periods in which a bidder bids within twenty cents, or two bid increments, of the 
RNNE prediction. We restrict our count to periods in which a bidder had a reservation 
value of at least $3.00. This recognizes that for low realizations of the reservation value 
most or all individually rational bids would fall within the twenty-cent range, as well as 
restricting attention to scenarios in which a bidder might perceive himself to have a 





The right panel of Figure 4.2 plots the distribution of these frequencies. Under 
RV, the median percentage of bids falling within the twenty-cent interval is 3%. Eleven 
bidders registered zero bids within that interval; four bidders exceeded 10%, with a 
maximum of 21%. Under OP, four bidders had no bids in the interval. The median 
percentage in the interval was 26%, with a maximum of 55%.  
Result 3. Market prices in the Dutch are below those in the sealed-bid in both 
frames.  
The regularity that the Dutch auction gives lower market prices than the sealed-
bid remains true under OP. The null hypothesis that the average of the market-to-theory 
price ratios is equal in sealed-bid and Dutch, tested against the two-sided alternative, can 
be rejected for all three intervals in Table 4.1. For the sessions under RV, p-values for 
the tests are .0026 for periods 1-10, .00081 for 6-15, and .023 for 51-60. For the sessions 
under OP, the p-values are .094 for periods 1-10, .016 for periods 6-15, and .080 for 
periods 51-60.  
 
DISCUSSION 
We show that bidding behavior in private-values, first-price laboratory auctions is 
sensitive to the presentation of the outcomes. With a frame in which the payoff 
computation for outcomes is presented in parallel, subjects bid less aggressively, and 
more often submit bids which are close to the prediction of the risk-neutral Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. This is evidence in favor of the proposition that subjects perceive the 
environments differently, even though a theorist would consider the payoff 
transformation irrelevant for a risk-neutral bidder.  
In a study of field auctions for antique collectible United States coins, Harrison et 
al., (2007) write  
We hypothesize that there is a danger that the imposition of an exogenous 
laboratory control might make it harder, in some settings, to make 
reliable inferences about field behavior. The reason is that the 
experimenter might not understand something about the factor being 
controlled, and might impose it in a way that is inconsistent with the way 
it arises naturally in the field… (p. 433)  
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The reservation value in a private values action may be such a factor. While 
specialists are comfortable with the idea that every agent has a reservation value, in 
practice, such a reservation value is latent, insofar as an agent does not stop and formally 
assess a particular number unless called upon to do so. In imposing controls to establish 
the private values setting, the concept of the reservation value must be presented in a 
way that communicates the concept in terms familiar to the subject.  
The ultimate goal of absolutely establishing the internal and external validity of 
any design for an auction experiment is, by definition, unreachable. Our results represent 
progress in understanding how to map theory and field to the lab by proposing an 
alternative means of establishing the private value setting. Two translations of the 
private values environment elicit very different behavioral patterns. Which method – if 
either – adequately establishes the control that maintains the validity of those mappings 





In our exploration of Case-Based Decision Theory, we find that subjects do show some 
propensity to use case based reasoning in their decision making process. We consider it 
encouraging that, when able, CBDT organized as large a proportion of subjects’ 
decisions as did the simpler Max-Heuristic. However, the results of this rest upon our 
assumption that feature-based similarity is the main similarity consideration that subjects 
are employing. Further research is needed in the area of what similarity functions are 
appropriate for use in these types of tasks. Also, the monopoly decision making 
environment used here may not be the one most conducive to case based reasoning. A 
future area of research may be to explore other environments and decision making tasks.  
 After careful construction of a graphical interface in which sealed-bid and Dutch 
implementations of the first-price private-values auction can be presented as similarly as 
possible, we find that the non-isomorphism persists. Allowing the subjects to engage in 
60 independent auctions does not alleviate this result; there appears to be very little, if 
any, learning over time in the auctions. However, we do find that an implementation 
which uses a clock mechanism but does not reveal when others have bid elicits market 
prices between those of the sealed-bid and Dutch implementations. We conclude from 
this that there is something about the clock mechanism that helps to focus subjects on the 
price-probability trade-off central to the auction. 
 In a second attempt to better focus subjects on the price-probability trade-off in 
an auction environment, we find that presenting the reservation value as an outside price 
results in market prices that are significantly lower than those in the standard frame. We 
also find that subjects’ bids are now much better organized by risk-neutral Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium predictions. Continued efforts are needed to pinpoint exactly which 
behaviors are inherent to the auction mechanism and which are anomalies and artifacts 
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This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  Texas A&M University has 
provided funds for this research.  If you follow the instructions and make good 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money.  At the end of today’s session, 
you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.   
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work.  If 
you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you.  If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc. you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid.  We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
During this session you will be acting as a firm who is selling a good.  You will 
be selling your good to 30 independent markets.  You can think of these as 30 
geographically separated islands.  In each of the 30 markets (islands) you are the only 
seller of the good.  This means that nothing any other seller or firm does can affect you 
or your market.  Each period represents a new market and you will have to make a 
decision about how many units you want to produce for that market.  It is costly to 
produce this good and if you produce units that do not get sold in that market, you will 
NOT be able to keep those units for use in other markets.  At the end of each period you 
will earn profits on the units of your good that you do sell in that market.   
At the beginning of each period you will receive a Marketing Report that 
contains information regarding some Market Conditions for the current market.  You can 
think of this as information about the market that has been gathered for you by the 
Marketing Department of your firm.  Gathering this data is costly to your firm, as such 
your Marketing Department is not able to gather all information in every market. 
Therefore, the information that your Marketing Department does collect can vary from 
market to market. However, nothing you or anyone else does can change what 
information is gathered in any market.  
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After gathering the data the Marketing Department sends it to you.  
Unfortunately there is an error that occurs during that transmission.  Instead of receiving 
the actual data all you receive is a list of the Market Conditions that were collected and a 
table of symbols representing the actual data.  Fortunately the error is consistent. This 
means that identical symbols for a given Market Condition represent the same actual 
data.  For instance, if the Marketing Department gathers data that says median income is 
$35,000 and a blue triangle gets transmitted, then whenever the Marketing Department 
reports $35,000 for median income it will be transmitted as a blue triangle in the 
Marketing Report. However, a blue triangle can also appear for other Market Conditions, 
where it does not necessarily stand for $35,000. For example, if the Marketing 
Department gathers data on a high inflation rate and this information gets transmitted as 
a blue triangle, then all Marketing Reports with a high inflation rate will have a blue 
triangle in the table for inflation rate. 
  After you have received the Current Marketing Report you will be asked to 
choose a Production Value of 50, 100, 150, or 200 units. Your Profits each period 
depend on your Production Value and may also depend upon some of the Market 
Conditions.  After you have made your production choice, you will be informed of your 
Profits for that market.  You will then proceed to the next market where you will be 
given the new market’s Current Marketing Report.  You will then be asked to choose a 
Production Value for that market.  The session will continue in this manner until you 
have made production choices for 30 markets.  
In order to help you with your decisions, for each market the experimenter has 
included four different scenarios.  In each of these scenarios the experimenter was given 
a Marketing Report similar to the Marketing Reports that you will be given.  The 
experimenter then chose a Production Value in such a manner that each of the four 
production choices was chosen once.  The Profits reported in these scenarios are the 
profits that would have been earned in that market given the reported Market Conditions 
and the chosen Production Value.  The Profits reported in these scenarios will NOT be 
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included in your Total Profits.  Your Total Profits consist only of those profits that you 
earn during the session, i.e. when you are making the production decision. Your Total 





Figure A.1 – Decision Screen 
 
 
Figure A.1 gives an example of the decision screen.  At the top right of the 
screen you will see labeled the current market.  At the bottom right of the screen you 
will see your Total Profits, which will include all Profits you have earned so far.  On the 
left side of the screen you will also see a table with the four scenarios for the current 
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market.  In the first column from the left you will see labels for the Market Conditions, 
the Production Values, and Profits.  So in this market, your Marketing Department has 
gathered information on: the Tourist Population, the Wind, the Humidity, the UV Factor, 
and the Temperature.  Looking at the symbols in the table you can see that there is a blue 
triangle for Tourist Population in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. This means that the Tourist 
Population was the same in both of these scenarios.  You can also see that there is a blue 
triangle for Humidity in Scenario 3. While this is the same symbol that was present in 
Scenarios 1 and 2 for the Tourist Population, it does not necessarily represent the same 
thing that it did for Tourist Population.  Below the scenarios you will see the Production 
Values and Profits for those scenarios.  Again, the Production Values were chosen so 
that each value was chosen exactly once.  The Profits that you see are the Profits that 
would have been earned had the given Production Value been chosen with the given 
scenario.  On the right side of the screen you will see the Marketing Report for the 
current market, in the left hand column are the symbols representing the data from the 
report and in the right hand column are the labels for the different Market Conditions 
that are reported.  On the bottom of the screen you will see the menu of choices for your 
Production Value.   
In order to select a Production Value simply use your mouse to click in the circle 
to the left of the value you wish to choose.  After clicking in one of the circles you 
MUST click the Confirm button before your choice will be submitted.  If you wish to 
change your choice you may do so at any time BEFORE clicking the Confirm button.  
You may change your choice of Production Value as many times as you wish.  However, 
once you have clicked the Confirm button you will NOT be able to change your 
Production Value for the current market.  After you have clicked Confirm a results 
screen will appear and inform you of your Profits for the current market.  Once you have 
finished viewing these results click Continue to move on.  After you have clicked 
Continue, you will proceed to the next market where you will be given the new market’s 
Marketing Reports and asked to make a production choice for that market. 
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After you have made production choices for 30 markets the session will be over.  
A screen will appear informing you of your Total Profits and Total Earnings.  Your 
Total Earnings are the amount you will be paid in cash.  Your Total Earnings are 
calculated by dividing your Total Profits by 6,000.  In other words for every $6,000 in 
Profits that you made you will earn $1.00 in cash. For instance, if you earn a Total Profit 
of $96,000 then your Total Earnings will be $16.  If you did not choose to receive a 
hang tag for parking then you will receive a $5.00 show-up fee in addition to your Total 
Earnings.  In that case your Total Payment will be calculated by adding the $5.00 show-
up fee to your Total Earnings.  So in the above example your Total Payment would be 
$16.00 + $5.00 or $21.00 in cash.  However, if you did choose to take a hang tag for 
parking your Total Payment will be the same as your Total Earnings.  Once the session 
is over and everyone has viewed their Total Earnings you will be called up, one at a 
time, to be paid privately and in cash.  The session will not be finished until everyone 
has made decisions for all 30 of their markets.  After you have finished please wait 
patiently for all remaining markets to finish. Are there any questions?  If you do have a 
question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.  Do not ask any 
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